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Patent Protection
negotiate at the bargaining table for either the exclusion from the agree-
ment of provisions regarding seniority rights or the inclusion in the col-
lective bargaining agreement of a provision to the effect that all em-
ployees' rights to a job cease at the termination of the agreement. Since
it is unlikely that unions will agree to either of these concessions man-
agement will be put in a helpless position if the Glidden "vested rights"
doctrine is adhered to.
LAWRENCE R. SCHNEIDER
Patent Protection Under the Tariff Act
In the spring of 1960, a small Ohio corporation received information
that certain items which infringed a patent owned by it were being im-
ported into this country from Hong Kong and Japan. The items in
question were plastic self-closing coin purses, and they were being sold
for approximately one third to one half of the price of the domestic
item. Additionally, although the purses in question appeared to the
casual observer to be identical to the domestic item, they were inferior
in quality. The domestic company, naturally fearing confusion on the
part of the public, with a resultant damage to its reputation and markets,
looked for a way to halt the importation.
Unfortunately, the domestic concern possessed no patent protection
in the countries of manufacture and was consequently precluded from
recourse to the courts of those countries And therefore the manu-
facturer turned to the laws of the United States for a solution. Basically
two remedies were available. First, the importer or importers could be
sued for patent infringement for selling the patented articles in this coun-
try.2 Second, the matter could be brought before the United States Tariff
Commission in an attempt to have the objectionable items excluded from
importation!
Although these remedies were not mutually exclusive, the patent
owner in question chose the second alternative. At this time, it is impos-
1. Complaint of Quickey Mfg. Co., In the Matter of Unfair Methods of Competition and Un-
fair Acts before the United States Tariff Commission, filed June 2, 1960. This complaint is
on file at the United States Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.
2. The sale by the importer is clearly an act of infringement under the statute which states
that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention... infringes the
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
3. 46 Stat. 703 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. 5 1337a (1940). There is potentially a
third method which is ancillary to the Tariff Act proceedings. Other governmental agencies
are directed to cooperate with the Tariff Commission in these matters. 46 Stat. 700 (1930),
19 U.S.C. § 1334 (1960). In the situation discussed above, the State Department unsuccess-
fully brought the matter to the attention of the governments of the manufacturers involved.
For a brief discussion of the State Department's possible role in these situations, see Schul-
singer, Legal Aids for Meeting Import Competitf;*, 5 PRAc. LAW. 27, 46 (1959).
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sible to determine just what success will be had since, although a hearing
has been held, no decision has yet been rendered by the Tariff Commission.
However, the situation presents a pressing problem and one which merits
attention at a time when American business is faced with rising competi-
tion from many areas. Comparative production costs are such that the
situation is almost certain to occur with increasing frequency unless an
effective way is found to protect American patent rights. It should be
emphasized at this point that the purpose here is not to defeat competition
per se or to espouse protectionism, but to protect rights granted under
the patent laws of the United States. Accordingly, the advantages and
disadvantages of the aforementioned methods of protecting these rights
will be examined herein, together with some other possible, though less
effective, courses of action.
The problem, reduced to practicalities, is to ascertain the most effec-
tive remedy. Effectiveness must be measured by the cost of the proceed-
ing to the company or patent owner affected and by the finality and com-
pleteness of the relief afforded. Accordingly, this article will analyze
the pertinent statutes and case law in an attempt to determine which
approach is truly the most effective and whether either is entirely satis-
factory.
Parenthetically, since it is obvious that the above situation may arise
in regard to trademarks and copyrights as well as patents,4 the protection
provided domestic owners of these rights against infringing importation
will also be considered. Similar alternative procedures are presented in
the trademark and copyright cases although, as will be seen, there is a
substantial difference in the effectiveness of the resultant protection.
Since the rights with which we will be concerned are those of the
owner of a United States Letters Patent, Registered Trade Mark, or Copy-
right, it is necessary to briefly consider the nature of these rights in gen-
eral and then to examine the specific recourse available to their owners
when faced with the threat of infringing importations from foreign com-
petitors.
REMEDIES UNDER THE PATENT LAWS
The Patent Grant
Basically a patent is a limited monopoly enabling a first inventor to
exclude others from practicing his invention for a period of seventeen
years. This limited monopoly is justified on the ground that it is bene-
ficial to the state to bring into existence new and original inventions.
4. The copyright situation may be solved by the Universal Copyright Convention, which
says, in part: "Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first published
in that state shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as that other State
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The monopoly thus granted is offered as an inducement and reward to the
inventor in return for this benefit to the state.5
In the United States, patents were recognized by the individual states
as early as 1641,' and when the Constitution was adopted, authority was
provided therein for the establishment of the federal patent system:
The Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries... .
Pursuant to this constitutional authority and in keeping with the above
theory, Congress has enacted patent statutes establishing a patent system
in the United States.' This statutory system includes the process by
which a patent may be obtained, standards for obtaining a patent, and
the protection of it once it has been granted. A detailed discussion of the
Patent Act is of course beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief
review of the sections thereof dealing with the enforcement of the patent
owner's rights is pertinent.
Infringement?
The Patent Act makes anyone who "without authority makes, uses,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States" or anyone who
"actively induces infringement of a patent" liable as an infringer.1" The
patent owner has a remedy by civil action against the infringer.'1 And
this civil action may result in damages or an injunction or both, together
with costs and, in exceptional cases, attorney fees.' Also, of course, the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine patent infringement
accords to works of its nationals first published in its own territory." Universal Copyright Con-
vention, Sept. 6, 1952, art. II (1), T.I.A.S. No. 3324 (effective Dec. 6, 1954).
For a more detailed discussion of the Convention, see Sargoy, U.C.C. Protection it; the
United States: The Coming Into Effect of the Universal Copyright Convention, 33 N.Y.U.L
REV. 811 (1958); Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention, 55 CoLUM. L REv. 1137
(1955).
5. See, e.g., BmsTrERELD, PATENT LAW FOR LAwYERS, STUDENTS, CHEMISTS, AND EiN-
GInER 2 (2d ed. 1949).
6. 1 WALKMR, PATENTS 30 (Deller ed. 1937).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-93 (1952).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
11. "A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C.
§ 281 (1952).
12. "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions
... to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent .... " 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952).
"Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award... damages adequate to compen-
sate for the infringement... together with interest and costs as fixed by the court .... The
court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1952).
"The court in exceptional cases may award attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 (1952).
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since Congress is charged with the authority to enact patent laws. 8 Finally,
in such infringement actions the patent is presumed valid and the burden
of proving it invalid rests on the party asserting its invalidity. 4
Of particular interest in regard to the problem at hand are the statu-
tory defenses to a charge of patent infringement. They are principally:
(1) noninfringement or absence of liability of infringement; (2) in-
validity of the patent. 5 At the risk of oversimplification it can be said
that the defendant will prevail if he shows that either the plaintiff was
not entitled to the patent originally or that he has not invaded the scope
of the plaintiff's patent protection. These defenses are consistent with the
theory of patent protection, for no one would suggest that a person could
protect what he has not invented or extend the boundaries of his inven-
tion to the inventions of others or to matters within the public domain.
However, as we shall see later, these defenses are minimal when com-
pared with those available to an alleged infringer under the Tariff Act.
The Product Patent
It is dear that the best way to halt infringement of a patent for an
article of manufacture' 6 is to sue the manufacturer of that article. This
of course seals off the source of the offending article and enables the
patent owner to enjoy the limited monopoly which has been granted to
him. However, an infringement suit must be brought in the district in
which the defendant resides or in which the act of infringement oc-
curred.' Thus in a situation in which a patented article has been manu-
factured abroad, the United States patent owner is powerless to proceed
directly against the manufacturer due to a lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the importer or vendor of
an infringing article is liable for infringement by virtue of selling the
articles in the United States. But this raises a problem of practicality. In
the first place, it may be extremely difficult even to find or identify the
importer. Often the first notice to the patent owner of the existence of an
infringement comes after the articles have passed through the importer
13. Cinema Patents Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 62 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1932).
14. 35 U.S.C. 5 282 (1952).
15. Ibid.
16. Generally the classes of inventions for which patents are granted are: (1) processes,
(2) machines, (3) compositions of matter, (4) articles of manufacture, (5) plants, and
(6) designs for articles of manufacture. WOODLING, INVENTIONS AND THEIR PRO'Ecr ON
145 (1954). For the purposes of this article, only "process" and "product or article" patents
will be considered. A "process" means a mode or method by which a result is produced.
Kelly v. Coe, 99 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1938). A "product or article" as used herein includes
a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). That is, it is
the result produced by a process.
17. "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular established place of business." 62 Stat. 936 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1950).
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to numerous retail outlets. The patent owner must then trace the article
back through the middlemen to the importer, which may be a difficult,
costly, and slow process.
In the second place, even if the patent owner prosecutes a successful
infringement suit against an importer, he has no assurance that he has
seen the last of the infringing item. The foreign manufacturer has merely
lost one outlet. If he so desires, he need merely contact a new importer
and begin anew. The patent owner would then be returned to his
original position. It would be necessary to begin the tedious process of
investigation and litigation once more. It is pertinent to note here that
the new importer may well be innocent of any wrongful intent. Conse-
quently, even though the patent owner must relitigate against the same
item made by the same manufacturer, he will very likely be denied treble
damages.'
8
From what has just been said, it is apparent that while a remedy does
exist for the owner of a United States product patent against the importa-
tion of items infringing upon that patent, the remedy is a less than satis-
factory one.
The Process Patent
If the remedy available to the owner of a product patent is imperfect,
the remedy available to the owner of a United States process patent in the
foreign importation situation is non-existent." If the act of infringement,
that is, the use of the process, has not occurred in the United States, there
is no liability for selling the resulting product in this country.20 This is
so because the infringement of a process patent occurs when the process
is used or followed and is unrelated to the article produced by it. The
inventor of a new method or process cannot patent the article produced
unless the article itself possesses independent patentability.2' It neces-
sarily follows that, since the only act which has occurred in this country is
the sale of an unpatented article, there has been no act of infringement
committed here and consequently there is no jurisdiction to sue either the
manufacturer or the importer.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952). Treble damages are usually awarded for infringement only
in those cases where there has been fraud or conduct tantamount thereto. Armstrong v. Emer-
son Radio & Phonograph Corp., 132 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). There is no particular
reason to assume that the second importer would be guilty of fraud - he may well be inno-
cent.
19. Note, A Review of Protection of Patent Interests From Unfair Methods of Competition
in Importation, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 282, 286 (1957).
20. Cochrane v. Badische Anlin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
21. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938);
It; re Jones, 30 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1929). The product of the process must be a new and
useful product independent of its method of production. The process may be patentable
while its result will not be unless it too possesses novelty. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Coe,
87 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
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It is unnecessary to consider the domestic law regarding protecting
products made by patented processes further except to note the interesting
fact that the rule is different in many foreign countries.2 Great Britain
serves as an informative example.
In the case of a patent for a process or for a machine, the sale in
Great Britain of goods manufactured in a foreign country by the un-
authorized use of the British process or machine constitutes an infringe-
ment.
23
The pragmatism behind this approach was clearly expressed by one
English court in these words:
If the law were otherwise, then when a man has patented an invention,
another might, by merely crossing the channel, and manufacturing abroad
and selling in London ... articles made by the patented process, wholly
deprive the patentee of the benefit of his invention. 24
This language is certainly apt, for under the patent laws of the United
States exactly such a deprivation does exist. It is clear that any change
in the patent laws of the United States to protect such products would
meet with strong opposition on the ground that it protects something
which the patentee has not invented.25  And this opposition would per-
haps be valid with respect to domestic infringers, since the patentee does
have access to the domestic user of his process. However, when speaking
of foreign infringers, the validity of this argument is lost. The American
process patentee has no judicial access to the foreign infringer and is thus
left without a remedy in the situation where products manufactured in a
foreign country by the unauthorized use of the American process patent
are sold in this country.
Leaving aside at this point the problems which the product and
process patentee face under the patent laws of this country, another means
of redress, applicable in some measure to both parties, may be studied.
This means of redress is found under the tariff laws of this country.
REMEDIES UNDER THE TARIFF ACT
Section 1337 of the Tariff Act provides that the importation of arti-
cles which constitute "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts of
22. Stark, Efforts by Treaty, Case and Statute to Provide Holders of Process Patents Protec-
tion Against Imported Goods Made by the Patented Process, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 21, 25
(1960). The partial list given includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland.
23. SHELLEY, TERRELL, & SHELLEY, PATENTS 41 (10th ed. 1961).
24. Wright v. Hitchcock, L. R. 5 Ex. 37, 47 (1870).
25. See, e.g., Lutz, Unwarranted Extension of Process Patents, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 46
(1960). The Tariff Commission has urged that the domestic patent laws be amended in this
manner. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N 19TH ANN. REP. 13 (1935). In the same report, the Com-
mission sought to divest itself entirely of responsibility in this area by giving the federal
courts the power to issue exclusion orders in patent infringement suits and by having the
Federal Trade Commission deal with unfair competition.
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the importation of articles into the United States ... are declared unlaw-
ful," and section 1337a extends this to products manufactured by a process
covered by a United States patent.26 Such items may be excluded from
importation into the United States. Before examining the very few cases
which have arisen under these sections of the Tariff Act, a brief outline
of the procedure involved in the procurement of an order excluding such
items from importation is necessary.
Procedure Under the Tariff Act
When a domestic manufacturer discovers that someone is importing
goods which damage his business, as did the corporation mentioned at
the beginning of this article, he must decide upon a method of protecting
himself. Assuming that he chooses to seek exclusion of the goods under
section 1337 of the Tariff Act, there are certain procedures to be fol-
lowed. Initially a complaint must be filed with the Tariff Commission.
Assuming that a patent is involved, the complaint will usually allege the
existence of the patent, that the goods complained of infringe that
patent, that the importation of the foreign-made product either has in-
jured or will have a tendency to injure a domestic industry, and that the
domestic industry is efficiently and economically operated.
It is interesting to note that although section 1337 does not expressly
mention patents, all the reported cases which have arisen under this sec-
tion have involved patents or trademarks and the amendment to the stat-
ute made in 1940 contains an express reference to patents."
After receiving the complaint, the Commission sends out investi-
gators to study the facts and obtain information needed by the Commis-
sion. These investigators then submit a confidential report to the Com-
mission. If the facts disclosed in this report are deemed to warrant such
action, the Commission conducts a public hearing. All importers named
in the complaint are notified and notice of the hearing is published in
conformity with the Commission's rules.2 9 At the time of the hearing
26. The full text of the statutory provision reads: "(a) Unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or sub-
stantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated in the United States, or to
prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and com-
merce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when found by the President to exist
shall be dealt with in addition to any other provisions of law, as hereinafter provided." 46
Stat. 703 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1960).
27. Wolfe, The Importation of Infringing Articles and a Patentee's Subsequent Remedies
Before the Tariff Commission, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'r 214 (1957).
28. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
29. "Public notice of receipt of applications or complaints properly filed, of the institution
of investigations, of public hearings . . . and of other formal actions of the Commission...
will be given by posting a copy of the notice at the principal office of the Commission at
Washington, D. C., and at its office in New York City; and by publishing a copy of the notice
1962]
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the complainant introduces his evidence, subject to cross-examination by
the importer and the Commission." The importer's filing of an answer
and his appearance at the hearing are entirely voluntary, there being no
provision to compel his participation in the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, briefs are submitted and the Com-
mission makes its findings of fact. These findings are then submitted to
the President with recommendations from the Commission. It is then
for the President to decide whether the facts establish to his "satisfaction"
that the importation constitutes an "unfair method of competition" or
"unfair act" within the meaning of the act. If the President finds for
the complainant, he will direct that the items in question be excluded
from entry into this country. Upon this direction, the Secretary of the
Treasury, through the Collector of Customs, will refuse entry."1
The right of appeal is limited to questions of law. Such appeals are
taken from the Commission to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
And although the issue has not been conclusively settled," it appears that
the right of appeal is given only to the importer; accordingly, a finding
unfavorable to the complainant apparently ends the matter.
Cases Arising Under Sections 1337 and 1337a
Cases Establishing An Administrative Pattern
With the foregoing outline of procedure in mind, an analysis of cases
arising under the Tariff Act will offer insight into the act's practical
effect in the situation under discussion. Only six cases pertinent to the
operation of this section have been reported; one of these actually dealt
with a similar section of the Tariff Act of 1922."8 An indication of the
reasons for the scarcity of case law over a thirty year period can be seen
by examining the status of complaints filed under section 1337 between
1930 and 1960."4 Of fifty-seven complaints received in that period,
thirty-two were dismissed after preliminary inquiry, that is, without even
a public hearing. Such a dismissal is, of course, a victory for the im-
porter. Of the twenty-five complaints filed since 1949, fifteen have met
in the Federal Register and in Treasury Decisions. Copies of such notices will also be sent
to . .. all persons named in the application or complaint concerned ...... 19 C.F.R.
§ 201.10 (1951).
30. "[Witnesses may be questioned .. by any member of the Commission, or by any
agent designated by the Commission, or by any person who has entered an appearance, for the
purpose of assisting the Commission in obtaining material facts with respect to the subject
matter of the investigation." 19 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1951).
31. 54 Stat. 724 (1940), 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1960).
32. For a fuller discussion of the appeal situation, see pp. 392-93 infra.
33. Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852
(1930).
34. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, INVESTIGATIONS UNDER SECTION 1337 OF THE TARIFF ACT.
OF 1930 (1958).
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this fate. With regard to the other ten complaints filed since 1949, one
has been suspended pending the outcome of antitrust litigation and one
has progressed through the hearing stage and is awaiting final disposi-
tion. Three cases resulted in an express finding that there had been no
violation of section 1337.' Five were suspended pending the result of
concurrent litigation and were subsequently dismissed, presumably when
the complainant lost its civil suit. The final case resulted in a finding
of unfair methods of competition. However, in this last case, an agree-
ment reached between the parties resulted in the rescission of the exclu-
sion order."6 Only this last controversy reached the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.87 As previously mentioned, the fifteen cases dis-
missed without preliminary hearing could never have reached the courts
due to the patent-owner's lack of a right to appeal.
Before this administrative pattern had begun to take shape in the
1940's, a number of cases brought under the Tariff Act did find their
way to the courts. Frischer and Company v. Bakelite CorporationWu was
brought under section 1316 of the Tariff Act of 1922,"9 which contained
language substantially the same as that of its successor, section 1337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930. The appellant-importer therein, having seen his
goods excluded, made an attack on the constitutionality of the statute on
the grounds of vagueness and unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Both these contentions were rejected, although only the latter one was
squarely met. It was held that there was no unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power since Congress may validly establish a national tariff
policy, the enforcement and administration of which it can leave to a
government commission. The fact that ascertainment of the contingency
upon which such policy was to take effect had been left to agencies des-
ignated by Congress was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.40 Thus the broad constitutional authority for the power of the
Tariff Commission in this area was established in this case and was never
again seriously questioned.
The Frischer court also made four additional points which have
served as a basis for much of the authority to follow. First, the Tariff
Commission was held to be a fact-finding body whose function was to
provide facts upon which the President could base a decision.4' Second,
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 3-.
37. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
38. 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930).
39. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356 § 1316, 42 Stat. 858, 943 (1922).
40. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1927). For a thorough dis-
cussion of the questions concerning constitutionality, see Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 108 (1930).
41. Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 254 (C.C.P.A. 1930). This view of the
function of the Tariff Commission had been established some six years earlier. United States
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the articles in question were found to have been made in conformity with
the method of the patent and this constituted an unfair act." This par-
ticular finding was not necessary to the decision since the court also found
'palming off" which would have met even the technical definition of
unfair competition as well as trademark infringement." However, the
conclusion is inescapable that the feeling of the court was that infringe-
ment alone is an unfair act. This position has been repeatedly attacked"
but it would appear to be the correct view, at least under sections 1337
and 1337a. The holding is also noteworthy in that there was no men-
tion of the word "patent" anywhere in section 1337. But the court cor-
rectly assumed that they were meant to be protected.45 Third, it was
held that "if there be in the record any substantial evidence in support
of the various findings of the Commission, then such findings should
stand."46 This last approach has been consistently followed in subsequent
decisions. 7 Finally, it was held that the Commission had no authority to
pass on the validity of the patent. All it could do was treat certified
patents as prima facie valid.4" If the importer entered evidence that no
such patent had in fact been issued or that it had expired or had been
held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, these factors could be
considered. Otherwise, the Commission was bound to assume it was
dealing with a valid patent.'
"Unfair Methods of Competition" Under the Tariff Act -
Product and Process Patent Cases
Four years later, two more cases arose, this time under the Tariff Act
of 1930. In the first of these, In re Orion Company,5" a domestic corpo-
ration filed a complaint with the Tariff Commission under section 1337
ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491 (D.C.
Cit. 1924).
42. 39 F.2d at 257.
43. Id. at 260. Unfair competition originally developed as a supplement to the law of
trademarks and generally required "passing off" or "palming off." The gist of the action has
been said to be that no one should be able to sell his goods as those of another. 1 CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKs ch. 2 (2d ed. 1950). It is questionable if actual
"palming off" is still a prerequisite. 1 Nims, UNFAm COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 3
(4th ed. 1947).
44. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 445 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (dissenting opinion); In re
Amtorg, 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
45. This assumption was confirmed by Congress in 1940 when section 1337a was enacted,
specifically referring to patents. See note 64 intra and accompanying text.
46. 39 F.2d at 257.
47. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458
(C.C.P.A. 1934); In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
48. "A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
shall rest on the party asserting it." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952).
49. 39 F.2d at 258.
50. 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
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of the Tariff Act of 1930, alleging that certain goods were being im-
ported into the United States in violation of its patent and trademark
rights.
Upon filing of the complaint, the President directed the Secretary of
the Treasury to forbid entry of the goods in question, except under bond,
pending the outcome of the Tariff Commission's investigation.51 An
investigation and hearing were then conducted and the Commission
found that the patents in question were valid and were infringed by the
imports and that there was an injury to a domestic industry due to unfair
methods of competition. At the same time the Commission found that
the complainant's trademark. had not been infringed and thus this issue
was given no further consideration. On appeal the appellant-importer
alleged that the statute was unconstitutional for vagueness and repre-
sented an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch. The court found that the words "unfair methods of competi-
tion" and "unfair acts" are not unconstitutionally vague. An analogy
was made to identical wording of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which had been held constitutional,52 and to the Frischer case,53 wherein
identical wording in section 1316 of the Tariff Act of 1922 had been
upheld. Since the unlawful delegation argument was deemed success-
fully refuted in the Frischer case, the court refused to upset its prior find-
ing of constitutionality on either of the grounds advanced.
The appellant also contended that the facts merely showed infringe-
ment and that this alone did not constitute unfair acts or unfair methods
of competition but merely injury to the complainant's patent rights. It
was also alleged that the Commission had no jurisdiction to determine
the infringement question in the first place.
By way of explaining the Commission's actions, the court found that
it had merely treated the certified patents placed in evidence as prima
facie evidence of their validity on the authority of the Frischer case. 4
In addition, since the Commission had heard expert testimony to the
effect that the imports did constitute an infringement, the court con-
cluded that the imported articles were made in conformity with the sped-
fications and claims of the patent. Regarding this conclusion the court
said:
Such a finding of facts does not constitute a trial of the validity of any
51. The President acted under the authority of 46 Stat. 703 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)
(1960).
52. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce are declared unlawful .... " 72 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1960 Supp.). This
phrasing was upheld as constitutional in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. F.T.C., 258 Fed. 307 (7th
Cir. 1919).
53. 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
54. 71 F.2d at 460.
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of said patents or an ascertainment of infringement or non-infringe-
ment.55
The theory behind this statement is that the Commission merely finds
facts which may be the basis for a finding of unfair methods of competi-
tion by the President. There is no final finding of infringement or non-
infringement by the Commission which would be binding on the parties
in a subsequent patent-validity action.5 Stressing the predicament in
which a patent owner would be without section 1337, the court upheld
the procedure followed by the Commission. Thus, since substantial evi-
dence supported the Commission's finding, it was affirmed.5" Unfortu-
nately the court avoided, in part, the contention that even if infringe-
ment existed, that fact alone would not equal unfair competition. How-
ever, since no acts other than infringement were alleged, the dear impli-
cation again, as in the Frischer case, was that infringement alone con-
stituted an "unfair method of competition."
In re Northern Pigment Company s was decided the same day as the
Orion case and was substantially similar on its facts to the latter case with
one exception: Northern Pigment involved a process patent rather than
a product patent so that importation and sale of the article derived from
the patent did not constitute an infringement. Nonetheless, the court
in Northern Pigment reached the same result as it did in Orion. In fact,
it went a step further and stated:
... the importation into this country of a product made without the
authority of a patentee, under the process of an American patent, such
as is shown in the case at bar, falls within the provision 'unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States.'59
As we have seen, the prevailing view in the United States is that one can-
not protect the unpatented product of a patented process, and that the
sale of such a product does not constitute an infringement. But notwith-
standing this general precept, the court in Northern Pigment reasoned
that the phrase "unfair methods of competition" as used in section 1337
was intended to cover a much broader area than the term "unfair compe-
tition" in its non-statutory sense. It found that an act which was not an
infringement under domestic patent law might nevertheless constitute
an unfair method of competition within the meaning of the Tariff Act.
Such a construction, the court indicated, would carry out the stated pur-
55. Id. at 465.
56. Where there is a determination of validity or invalidity in a domestic suit regarding patent
infringement, such a determination will of course be binding on the parties in any subsequent
action.
57. 71 F.2d at 461.
58. 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
59. Id. at 450.
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pose of the act, namely, the protection and encouragement of domestic
manufacturers. On the other hand, it pointed out that a narrow inter-
pretation would certainly defeat the purposes of the act by leaving the
domestic manufacturer without a remedy against the foreign infringer.
The conclusions reached in this case reaffirmed somewhat vaguer state-
ments to the same effect in the earlier case of Frischer and Company v.
Bakelite Corporation.6"
Less than a year later, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was
called upon to consider another case arising under section 1337 - In re
Amtorg.6 ' A domestic manufacturer, faced with the importation from
Russia of phosphatic minerals which had been manufactured by a process
covered by a United States patent, had obtained an exclusion order against
the Russian imports. In recommending the exclusion order the Tariff
Commission had relied upon its own earlier finding in the Frischer case
and the finding of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the
Northern Pigment case, both of which had determined that the approach
to process patent cases under domestic infringement law was inapplicable
to products made in a foreign country by the unauthorized use of an
American process patent. The Commission in the Amtorg case had rea-
soned that the Tariff Act had justifiably given what the patent laws had
not given: a remedy to the American process patentee against the foreign
infringer of that patent.
Despite the authority for the Commission's position, the importer ap-
pealed to the court on the sole ground that the Tariff Act was not de-
signed to enlarge substantive patent rights and that consequently the
complainant-patentee could not through the aegis of the act protect the
unpatented products of its patented process. The court, "upon mature
consideration,"' found itself in agreement with the importer. Endorsing
the argument that Congress had no intent to enlarge substantive patent
rights by enactment of the Tariff Act, the court expressly overruled the
Northern Pigment, Orion, and Frischer cases insofar as they applied to
process patents.6" And thus, once again, the process patentee was left
without a remedy against foreign infringers.
60. 39 F.2d at 254.
61. 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
62. Judge Garrett, who had rather reluctantly concurred in the Northern Pigment and Orion
cases, wrote the majority opinion in this case. The decision has been characterized as "more a
psychological reaction ...to an imagined excess of judicial self-assertion than a properly
reasoned, socially cognizant holding." Stark, Efforts by Treaty, Case and Statute to Provide
Holders of Process Patents Protection Against Imported Goods Made by the Patented Process,
42. J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 21, 43 (1960). See Note, 45 YALE L.J. 169 (1935); Comment,
49 HAR. L Rv. 162 (1935).
63. Reliance was placed on Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). This suit charged copy-
right infringement and unfair competition. The court found that there was no infringement
and thus there was no jurisdiction to determine the issue of unfair competition which was
founded on the same acts. However, this jurisdictional problem is not present in cases arising
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In 1940, taking the issue through full circle, Congress repudiated
the Amtorg case by adding section 1337a to the Tariff Act:
The importation for use, sale or exchange of a product made, produced,
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims
of any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same
status for the purpose of section 1337 of this title as the importation of
any product or artide covered by the claims of any unexpired valid
United States letters patent.64
As a result the law was dearly returned to the status it enjoyed after the
Northern Pigment case, and presumably remains so today. Additionally,
the initial assumption in the Frischer case that the act applied to patents
was sustained.
Cases Arising After the 1940 Amendment
Only two cases which have placed section 1337 in issue have been
reported since 1940.65 The first of these was In re Von Clemm, a case
which dealt with both process and product claims. It has been said that
the case is unsatisfactory on the process patent question in that it makes
no reference to the Amtorg case.66  But in view of the fact that Amtorg
was decided without the benefit of section 1337a, it is submitted that no
mention of Amtorg on this point is necessary or even relevant. The ma-
jority in Amtorg left no doubt concerning their position on the process-
product question and Congress was equally clear in refuting that position
five years later.
The real value of Von Clemm is that it gives voice to a more liberal
construction of the Tariff Act. The court admitted that there had not
yet been any substantial damage to the complainant, but that a tendency
to such damage had been shown and that that was sufficient. 7 This po-
sition was assailed by the dissent, which apparently chose to ignore the
plain language of the statute which condemns acts "the effect or tendency
of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry."
In addition, the majority refused to accept the proposition advanced
by the appellant that the Tariff Commission should have refrained from
under the Tariff Act, since the Commission's jurisdiction is predicated upon a charge of unfair
methods of competition and not upon a charge of patent infringement per se. Subsequent to
the Amtorg decision a statutory change was proposed by the American Bar Association Patent
Committee to restore the pre-Amtorg status of the law. Report of the Committee on Importa-
tion of Unpatented Products of a Process, 19 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 785 (1937).
64. 54 Stat. 724 (1940), 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1960).
65. S.J. Charia & Co. v. United States, 248 F.2d 124 (C.C.P.A. 1956); In re Von Clemm,
229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
66. Note, A Review of Protection of Patent Interests From Unfair Methods of Competition
in Importation, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 282, 297 (1957).
67. This view was first advanced in the Frischer case but was not stressed in the intervening
cases.
68. 46 Stat. 703 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1960) (Emphasis added.).
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acting until the validity of the patent had been decided in a then pending
suit.69 The Commission had refused to do this and the court agreed,
saying,
we are aware of no statute... which would justify, much less require,
this court to ignore the provisions of such section 1337 ... which we
must necessarily regard as requiring timely disposition of appeals arising
thereunder.70
Unfortunately, however, the Commission has not been consistent in its
approach to this question. In a number of cases heard by it before and
after Von Clemm the Commission refrained from taking action pending
the outcome of the patent-validity suit.7' Although there can be no
doubt that the question presents difficult policy considerations, the ap-
proach taken in Von Clemm would seem to be the more reasonable and
equitable one. The person to be protected is the patent owner. His
patent is prima fade valid until proven otherwise and if anyone should
suffer inconvenience it should be the person trying to invalidate it. And
since the Tariff Act makes no provision for damages, the owner of a
valid patent is greatly prejudiced by any delay in the issuance of an ex-
clusion order.
The latest reported case on this subject is S. J. Charia & Company v.
United States,7' which involved a protest against the refusal of a collector
of customs to admit certain items. The collector was acting under au-
thority of a Presidential exclusion order based on a section 1337 investi-
gation. The items in question (cigarette lighters) had been excluded
first in 1934, with the exclusion order to continue in effect until 1945.'
The exclusion order prohibited importation of lighters of a certain de-
scription and also any other lighters which infringed the complainant's
patent, which expired in 1945. In 1945 a supplemental order was issued
extending the exclusion order until 195V' It was this extended order
which the importer sought to nullify.
69. Such a procedure tends to place many cases in a suspended status for long periods of
time. On the average it takes approximately 15.3 months from the time a patent suit is filed
in a federal court until trial. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SuB.CoMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT IMGATION STATISTICS, 86TH
CONG., 2D SEsS. 3 (1961).
70. 229 F.2d at 443.
71. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMM'N, INVESTIGATIONS UNDER SECTION 1337 OF THE
TAmIFI AcT OF 1930 (July, 1960). An analysis of complaints filed between January 1,
1949 and May 1, 1958 shows that of the nine cases which were not dismissed after preliminary
investigation, five were suspended pending the outcome of litigation in the courts.
72. 135 F. Supp. 727 (Cust. Ct. 1954), affld, 248 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cit. 1956). This case
was brought before the Customs Court on the allegation that the Collector of Customs errone-
ously excluded the merchandise. The importer evidently chose to forego his appeal directly
from the Tariff Commission.
73. T.D. 47001, 65 TREAS. DEC. 659 (1934).
74. T.D.51238,80TREAS.DEC.92 (1945).
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The court, in upholding the exclusion order, found that the original
exclusion order was based upon two grounds: unfair simulation and in-
fringement. The court then reasoned that the President, by extending
the exclusion order, was not extending the term of the patent but merely
extending the protection against unfair simulation. The practical effect
of the President's order was of course to extend the patent protection since
the simulation complained of was simulation of the patented article itself.
Undefined Criteria
The above cases have left a few areas uncharted with the result that
some trouble will be encountered by parties attempting to utilize section
1337. Principally there are two phrases employed in the statute which
have not yet been judicially defined and which are inherently vague.
Specifically there has been no statement of policy as to what is neces-
sary to show "substantial injury" to an "efficiently and economically
operated industry." Presumably there are no standards established for
these terms and their application is left to the discretion of individual
commissioners, subject of course to the substantial evidence rule.
There is also an unanswered question regarding the right to appeal
from a finding of the Commission. All of the cases which have reached
the courts to date have involved appeals by importers who have seen
their goods excluded. Their right to judicial review is dear from the
plain language of the statute and the only decisions relating to such re-
view have dealt with its scope.
A situation is presented here which offends one's sense of fairness -
the complainant has no right to appeal at all. The proposition that the
Tariff Commission is a legislative agent in these matters and that Con-
gress may therefore prescribe the process by which its will shall be car-
ried out, may support the view that Congress need grant no review at
all.75 However, Congress has provided a judicial review for one party
and not for the other. It is true that such review is very limited in scope,
but the fact remains that the importer is at least protected against mani-
fest error. 6
Although there is no decisional authority precisely on the question of
the complainant's lack of appeal, the judicial attitude toward the Tariff
Commission was rather dearly stated by Justice Cardozo in Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Company v. United States:
75. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); T. M. Duche &
Sons v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 186 (Cust. 1952).
76. The review is technically limited to determining whether the statutory form has been
followed, Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933), although
in practice the scope of review appears to be much broader.
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The Tariff Commission advises; these other [agencies] ordain....
Whatever the appropriate label, the kind of order that emerges from
a hearing before a body with power to ordain is one that impinges upon
legal rights in a very different way from the report of a commission
which merely investigates and advises.... What issues from the Tariff
Commission as a report to the President, may be accepted, modified, or
rejected. If it happens to be accepted, it does not bear fruit in any-
thing that trenches on legal rights. No one has a legal right to the
maintenance of an existing rate of duty:7
This opinion later formed a basis for refusing an appeal based on the
Administrative Procedure Act, which says in part that
any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of
any relevant statute shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.Y8
In T. M. Duache & Sons v. United Statei 9 the court refused to allow the
Administrative Procedure Act to enlarge the scope of review to which
the appellant was entitled under the Tariff Act. If the act cannot be
used to enlarge the scope of review, can it be used to provide a review
where none exists? The fact that there was some review provided in the
Duche case may be important. Perhaps where no recourse whatsoever
is provided by the statute, a court would be more receptive to such an
approach at least to insure that the Commission has followed the statu-
tory formula in compiling its report"s
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS
By way of contrast with the patent owner's situation, the owner of a
registered trademark or copyright has a clear-cut remedy from two
sources when faced with damaging importation.
The Lanham Act specifically prohibits the importation of merchan-
dise simulating or copying a registered trademark."1 Similarly, the Tariff
Act makes it unlawful to import any merchandise bearing a trademark
owned by and registered in the Patent Office by a person domiciled in
the United States. 2 These statutes are enforced by the Bureau of Cus-
77. 288 U.S. at 318. The Tariff Commission is one of the few agencies exercising powers
that were once exercised by Congress. Thus only the procedural safeguards necessary for
Congressional hearings are involved. Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency,
61 COLuM. L. REv. 463 (1961). The author is critical of some Tariff Commission procedures,
especially in regard to the use of confidential information as provided in 19 C.F.R. § 201.6(1951).
78. 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
79. 39 C.C.P.A. 186 (Cust. 1952).
80. The broad problem of judicial review of Tariff Commission processes is cogently dis-
cussed in Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the President Par-
ticipates, 74 HARV. L. REV. 684 (1961).
81. 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1952). For an extensive discussion relating
specifically to trademarks, see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955).
82. 42 Stat. 975 (1922), 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1952).
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toms and the procedure is to register the trademark with the Treasury
Department."
The Copyright Act 4 also provides relief against infringing importa-
tions. For example, section 106 of the Copyright Act prohibits
the importation into the United States of any article bearing a false
notice of copyright thereon... or of any piratical copies of any work
copyrighted in the United States....s5
Copyrights are also protected by the Universal Copyright Convention, to
which the United States is a party.88
It should be noted that the rights protected by patents, copyrights,
and trademarks as well as the theory for protecting each of them varies
substantially. However, when dealing generally with protection af-
forded the holders of statutory rights against unfair importation, it is in-
teresting as well as disturbing to see the disparate degrees of difficulty
encountered. Neither copyright or trademark owners need submit to an
investigation before their presumptively valid rights are enforced. Nor
do they need to show "substantial injury" to an "efficiently and economi-
cally operated industry." They are on equal footing with both domestic
and foreign infringers.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Returning to the initial problem of a domestic manufacturer faced
with infringing importation, certain conclusions are possible. The do-
mestic patent owner is dearly at a disadvantage when confronted with a
foreign infringement as compared with a domestic infringement. Basi-
cally the differences relate to the burden of proof necessary to enforce and
protect the patent. This burden varies considerably. To prevail against
a domestic infringer, the patent owner need not show an efficiently and
economically operated business nor need he show substantial inJury to a
domestic industry or a tendency to such injury. All he needs to prove
is that he owns a valid patent and that the other party has infringed it.
It is submitted that the inclusion of these additional burdens in the Tariff
Act actually places a foreign competitor in a better position than a domes-
tic competitor. The domestic competitor is much easier to catch and
punish. No need for such a disparity is evident, especially if the Tariff
Act is indeed designed to encourage American industry.8" Therefore,
these requirements should be discontinued.
83. 19 C.F.R. 5 11.15 (1951).
84. 17 U.S.C. 5 106-09 (1960).
85. 17 U.S.C. 5 106 (1960). In this connection see the recent decision of the Customs
Court in Norwood Imports v. United States, 132 U.S.P.Q. 216 (1962).
86. See note 4 supra.
87. For example, the domestic company mentioned at the outset of this article recovered a
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In addition, the fact that appeal from the findings of the Commission
is limited to the importer alone is unnecessarily one-sided. It is apparent
that if it were not for the Tariff Act, the owner of a product patent would
have an unsatisfactory remedy and the owner of a process patent would
have none. Thus the appeal situation as set forth in the act indicates that
if the Commission decides against the patent owner for any one of several
reasons unrelated to his patent rights, he will be foreclosed from the en-
forcement of those rights to a substantial extent. This is particularly
significant in view of the fact that of the twenty-five complaints brought
before the Commission from 1949 to 1960, only one resulted in a find-
ing favorable to the domestic patent owner."8 The right to appeal should
certainly be made available to the complainant as it now is to the
importer.
What is sought by these proposed changes is not the strangulation of
competition or the stifling of international trade. But competition should
not be supported by means manifestly unfair such as hiding behind a na-
tional boundary to infringe a patent.8" It is true that the infringement
may be carried on entirely abroad with impunity unless the patentee un-
dertakes the expense of obtaining patent coverage abroad.9" No brief
is made herein for the extra-territorial operation of patents - but a
United States patent is a limited monopoly granted by the United States
and ought to be adequately protected within the territorial limits of the
United States and not be robbed of its effectiveness in this manner.9
The framework for such protection is present in the Tariff Act. But
the Act should be relieved of the incumbrances mentioned above to bring
the remedy for patent infringement through importation into conformity
with the trademark and copyright remedy. There is no justification for
this lesser protection for the patent right.
REESE TAYLOR
$47,000 judgment against a domestic infringer. Squeeze-A-Purse Corp. v. Stiller, 175 F.
Supp. 667 (N.D. Ohio 1959), a&'d, 280 F.2d 424 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960). By way of contrast, if it prevails before the Tariff Commission, no damages will be
assessed against the infringer. His goods will merely be excluded from entry.
88. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMN, INvESIGATIONS UNDER SECrIoN 1337 OF THE
TARIFF Act OF 1930 at 3, 4 (July 1960).
89. The fact that the act is lawful where it is done should not necessarily make it lawful in
the United States. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
90. In addition to the obvious expense involved in the prosecution of applications in several
foreign countries there are annual taxes to be paid in most of them. Also there are generally
requirements that they be worked in the country within certain periods under penalty of com-
pulsory licensing. Sn MONNoT, RiNuy & BLUNDELL, PATENTS AN 'TRADEMARKS IN WEST
EUROPE AND MEDITEuANEAN CouNTRIEs (9th ed. 1956).
91. The value of an effective patent system should also be considered. "Patents and the
patent system provide meaning, structure and stability for the process by which the frontiers
of technology are pushed back into the unknown." Draper, The Patent System From a Sc-
entit's Point of View, 5 PAT., T.M. & Copy. J. REs. & EDUC. 71 (1961).
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